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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ers" to be obeyed only grudgingly,130 or to be treated as no
higher than case law."3 l By resting on policy preference and
assumptions that sweep a bit too broadly, the court, in Austin
v. Ford, chose improper means of accomplishing its valid
ends. Austin has the effect of improperly preempting a liabil-
ity theory provided by statute which could result in actual de-
nial of recovery where it would otherwise obtain. The court
should modify the Austin rule to make it clear that the re-
striction on products liability theories is only proper to avoid
unnecessary duplication. The court should recognize that, be-
cause warranty and strict liability are not coextensive and
that the necessity of concurrent theory pleading often would
not be known until the factfinder completes its task, interfer-
ence with maintaining concurrent theories should be mini-
mized. The court should be guided in this problem area by the
policies of judicial restraint and separation of powers.
STEVEN P. MORSTAD
PATENTS - Patentable Subject Matter - Living
Man-made Organisms Held to Be Patentable Subject
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). Article I, section 8
of the United States Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their... Discoveries." Pursuant to this grant of power, un-
known at common law, Congress has authorized patent pro-
tection for the invention or discovery of "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof."1 In the much pub-
130. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-15
(1936).
131. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934).
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). The first federal patent statute enacted in the United
States, the Patent Act of 1790, specified the classes of patentable subject matter as
"any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein." Patent Act of 17 90, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 111 (repealed 1793). In enacting the Patent
Act of 1793, Congress changed the classes of patentable subject matter to "any new
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licized case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that under 35 U.S.C. § 101 a live, human-
made micro-organism is a patentable subject matter. This ar-
ticle will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in
Chakrabarty and evaluate its impact on three areas: patent
law, industry, and the continuing debate over the potential
costs and benefits of genetic engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Concepts of Patentability and Living Organisms as
Patentable Subject Matter
A discovery or invention is not patentable unless it falls
within the categories of patentable subject matter specified in
35 U.S.C. § 101. Assuming an invention to be patentable sub-
ject matter under section 101, other conditions and require-
ments of Title 35 must also be satisfied before a patent will
issue.3 Conditions of patentability include utility,4 novelty,5
and nonobviousness.6 Additionally, the discovery or invention
must lend itself to a precise, written description.7 If an inven-
tion constitutes patentable subject matter and fulfills all con-
ditions and requirements of patentability, a patent is granted,
giving the holder the right for seventeen years from the date
of issuance to prevent all others from making, using or selling
the invention.8
Section 101 enumerates four categories of patentable sub-
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
ful improvement [thereon]." ch. 11, 1 Stat. 319 (1793). Subsequent patent statutes in
1836, 1870 and 1874 carried over the same classes of statutory subject matter. In the
Patent Act of 1952, the only change in the categories of patentable subject matter
was that the term "art" was replaced by "process." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
3. Patent protection is, in essence, a government sanctioned monopoly on the in-
vention. The conditions and requirements of Title 35 serve to protect the public's
interests against the potentially adverse effects of such monopolistic grants.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
5. Id. § 102.
6. Id. § 103.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976):
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains...
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
8. Id. § 154.
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ject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and composi-
tion of matter.' For almost 200 years, section 101 and its
predecessor statutes have encompassed a wide spectrum of in-
ventions ranging from neutronic reactors to purified vitamin
B-12. This is not to say that all discoveries are patentable.
Notably, several categories of discoveries have been denied
patent protection under the "law of nature" and "product of
nature" rules.
The "law of nature" rule, a poorly defined judicial crea-
tion, states in effect that abstract principles, physical phe-
nomena, and ideas are not patentable discoveries. 10 The pur-
pose of the "law of nature" rule appears to be the prevention
of undesirable restrictions on scientific and industrial progress
that might result from granting a monopoly on basic princi-
ples and natural phenomena."' However, the recent Supreme
Court case of Parker v. Flook12 took the approach that laws of
nature are not patentable because they are not statutory sub-
ject matter under section 101.13
Closely related to the "law of nature" rule is the equally
ill-defined doctrine that "products of nature" are not patenta-
ble. As generally defined in decisions, a product of nature is
one occurring on the earth in a state that has not been
changed by any act of a human being.14 While some decisions
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) which also includes "improvements" of the four
categories.
10. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) where Samuel Morse un-
successfully attempted to claim "electro-magnetism, however developed, for making
or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances" as a patentable
invention. See, e.g., LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852); Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Parker v. Flook, 427 U.S. 584
(1978).
11. Comment, Patentability as Affected by the Law of Nature Rules - The Kalo
Doctrine, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 391, 391-94 (1949).
12. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
13. In Flook, the Supreme Court held that an improved method of calculation for
updating alarm limits in a catalytic conversion process was not patentable subject
matter under section 101. The Court's decision has been criticized for confusing the
question of whether a discovery constitutes patentable subject matter under section
101 with the question of whether the discovery satisfies the conditions of patentabil-
ity, specifically, the nonobviousness condition of section 103. See In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 959-64 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
14. Like the "law of nature" rule, the "product of nature" rule has been used to
effectuate an anti-monopoly policy. See Comment, Patentability as Affected by the
Law of Nature Rules - The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MICH. L. Rav. 391, 398 (1949).
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imply a product of nature is not patentable subject matter,
the bulk of the cases propounding the "product of nature"
rule appear to rest on more orthodox grounds such as lack of
novelty, or obviousness. 15
Living organisms and processes using them have received
patents. Courts have long held such processes to be patenta-
ble subject matter.16 Despite a lack of judicial determination
that the organisms themselves are patentable subject matter,
the Patent Office has issued numerous patents for such orga-
nisms. The first of these was issued in 1873 when Louis Pas-
teur obtained United States patent 131,072 on "yeast, free
from organic germs and disease, as an article of manu-
facture.'
17
The only Supreme Court decision touching on the issue of
the patentability of living organisms is Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co."8 Funk involved a patent claim for a
mixture of noninhibitive strains of nitrogen-fixing bacteria
used as an inoculant in agriculture.1 9 Concluding that the pat-
entee had only discovered the "handiwork of nature," the
Court held the claims to the mixed inoculant invalid as not
constituting an invention within the meaning of the patent
statute.2 0 Although given an opportunity to address the issue
of the patentability of living organisms, the Court premised
its decision in Funk on lack of invention and not on the fact
that the bacteria were alive. Nowhere in the opinion is there
any indication that the characteristic of life alone would pro-
hibit patentability. Indeed, the Court seemed to proceed on
the assumption that living organisms were within the catego-
ries of patentable subject matter.
15. Id. at 394-98; Guttag, The Patentability of Microorganisms: Statutory Sub-
ject Matter and Other Living Things, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 247, 252-58 (1979).
16. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908).
17. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
18. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
19. The patentee had discovered that there exists in nature certain species of
root-nodule bacteria which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. He
used that discovery to produce a mixed culture which proved to be more effective
than prior bacterial strains in inoculating leguminous plants.
20. 333 U.S. at 131.
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B. Chakrabarty's Invention
In 1971, geneticist Ananda Chakrabarty began work in the
General Electric laboratory in Schenectady, New York. His
task was to engineer a special bacteria for use in controlling
oil spills. Prior to Chakrabarty's undertaking, several natu-
rally occuring bacterial strains were known to possess the abil-
ity to decompose individual components of crude oil, any
given strain degrading only a particular component. Biological
control of oil spills had involved the use of a mixture of the
strains on the theory that the cumulative degradative actions
would consume the oil and convert it into simpler substances
which, in turn, would serve as food for aquatic life. For vari-
ous reasons, however, the bacteria literally could not tolerate
each other's presence, and only a portion of the mixed culture
survived to attack the oil spill. To overcome this problem,
Chakrabarty employed a complex process in which he broke
apart the various bacteria and grafted parts of their control-
ling genetic material into Pseudomonas Aeruginosa, a bacte-
rial strain which itself exhibited no capacity for degrading oil.
The result was the creation of new strains of Pseudomonas
having the capability within themselves of degrading several
different oil components with greater speed and efficiency.
C. Procedural Background
In 1972, Chakrabarty filed a patent application, assigned
to General Electric Company, asserting thirty-six claims 21 re-
lating to his newly invented Pseudomonas bacteria.
Chakrabarty's claims were of three types: first, process claims
for the method of producing the bacteria; second, claims for
an inoculum comprised of the bacteria and a carrier material,
such as straw, floating on water; and, third, claims to the bac-
21. An "invention" in the popular sense may have many aspects in the patent law
sense and, technically speaking, may really be an aggregation of closely related inven-
tions all pertaining to the same contribution the inventor is making to the technologi-
cal arts. When this is so, as in the case of Chakrabarty's invention, an applicant may
define his invention(s) in "claims" (technical legal definitions of the spheres of pro-
tection sought, not descriptions of the invention) which may fall into different section
101 categories. For example, an inventor may have produced a new product which is
made by a new process and put to a new use. The invention is capable, therefore, of
being defined or "claimed" as a manufacture or composition of matter, as a process
for making the product, and as a process utilizing the product in some way. In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 964 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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teria themselves. 22 Although allowing the claims falling into
the first two categories, the patent examiner rejected claims
for the bacteria. His decision rested on two grounds: (1) that
the claimed bacteria were "products of nature" and (2) that as
living things they were not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of these claims to the
Patent Office Board of Appeals, and in 1976 the Board af-
firmed the examiner on the second ground.23 In concluding
that section 101 was not intended to cover living things such
as Chakrabarty's bacteria, the Board relied primarily on the
legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, in which Con-
gress intended patent protection to certain asexually repro-
duced plants.
In March, 1978, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed the Board's decision in a tersely worded opinion. 24
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals based the reversal
on its prior decision in In re Bergy25 in which it had held that
"the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal sig-
nificance" for the purposes of patent law.26
In June, 1978, the Supreme Court granted the Govern-
ment's petition for certiorari in Bergy but then vacated the
judgment and remanded the case "for further consideration in
light of Parker v. Flook, .... ., The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty
and consolidated the case with Bergy for reconsideration. In
1979, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reaffirmed its
earlier decisions and, in considering what light Flook shed on
22. Process patents, while available to biogenetic companies, are notoriously diffi-
cult to police against infringers. See Iron & Sears, Patents in Relation to Microbi-
ology, 29 ANN. REv. OF IhCROBIOLOGY 319, 320 (1975).
23. The Board concluded that as a Pseudomonas bacteria with multiple energy-
generating plasmids are not found in nature, the new bacteria were not products of
nature.
24. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
25. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Bergy involved a patent application for a pure
culture of Streptomyces vellosus, a naturally occuring micro-organism found to be
useful in the production of the antibiotic lincomycin. The Patent Office rejected the
claims in Bergy on grounds identical to those in Chakrabarty.
26. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
27. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). See note 13 supra, for the holding in
Flook. The salient feature of Flook was the Supreme Court's statement that the
courts "must proceed cautiously when ... asked to extend patent rights into areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress." 437 U.S. at 596.
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these cases, concluded dryly, "very simply we find none."2
The Government again sought certiorari, and the Supreme
Court granted the writ as to both Bergy and Chakrabarty2 9
II. THE Chakrabarty OPINION
Writing for the Court's majority,30 Chief Justice Burger
characterized the question presented as a narrow one of statu-
tory interpretation, the question being whether Chakrabarty's
micro-organism constituted a "manufacture"31 or "composi-
tion of matter"3 2 within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101. In the
majority's view, the choice of such expansive terms as "manu-
facture" and "composition of matter," modified by the pro-
noun "any," plainly indicated congressional intent to give
broad scope to the patent laws. It found support for a liberal
construction in the legislative history of the patent law, in
particular, the committee reports which accompanied the 1952
recodification of the patent laws and which indicate Congress
intended the statutory subject matter of section 101 to "in-
clude anything under the sun that is made by man."' 3 After
distinguishing Chakrabarty's micro-organism from claims re-
jected in prior cases under the "law of nature" and "product
of nature" rules," the Court concluded it was not nature's
handiwork but a product of human ingenuity, and as such,
patentable subject matter under section 101.35
28. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 967 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
29. Subsequently, Bergy was dismissed as moot, leaving only Chakrabarty for de-
cision. 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980).
30. The Chief Justice was joined in his opinion by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
Stewart and Rehnquist.
31. The Chief Justice defined "manufacture" as "the production of articles for use
from raw materials prepared by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations whether by hand labor or by machinery." 100 S. Ct. at
2207 (citing American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
32. "Composition of matter" was defined as "all compositions of two or more sub-
stances and ... all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union,
or-of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids." Id.
(citing Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
33. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1952).
34. In particular, the Court distinguished Chakrabarty's invention from that in
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. See note 18 supra, and accompanying
text.
35. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. The Chief Justice did not specify whether Chakrabarty's
micro-organism constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" or both.
1980]
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The Court rejected the Government's two arguments. The
Government first contended that the 1930 Plant Patent Act s6
and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act37 evidenced con-
gressional understanding that the subject matter of section
101 did not include living organisms; if section 101 included
living organisms, both Acts would have been superfluous. Re-
jecting this argument, the Court found nothing in the lan-
guage or legislative histories of the 1930 and 1970 Acts to sub-
stantiate the view ascribed to Congress by the Government. 8
It concluded that the Plant Patent Act was enacted to over-
come two specific obstacles which, prior to 1930, were thought
to deny patent protection for plants. First, plants, even those
artifically bred, were thought to be unpatentable under the
"product of nature" rule.39 The second obstacle was the strin-
gent "written description" requirement of the patent law.40
Compliance with this requirement was viewed as being diffi-
cult, if not impossible, as new plants often differed from old
only in color or fragrance. Accordingly, the 1930 Act relaxed
the description requirement for plants within its protection.41
As for the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, the Court found
its sole purpose to be that of extending patent protection to a
36. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1976). The 1930 Act provided patent protection for cer-
tain asexually reproduced plants.
37. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976). The 1970 Act authorized patents for certain
sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its coverage.
38. The sole indication in the 1930 Act's legislative history that Congress was con-
cerned with the patentability of all living organisms is found in statements made by
Secretary of Agriculture Hyde. In a letter to the Chairman of the House and Senate
Committees considering the 1930 Act, Secretary Hyde expressed the view that "the
patent laws . . . at the present time are understood to cover only inventions or dis-
coveries in the field of inanimate nature." S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
(1930). In the Chief Justice's view, "Secretary Hyde's opinion . . . is not entitled to
cdntrolling weight. His views were solicited on the administration of the new law and
not in the scope of patentable subject matter - an area beyond his competence." 100
S. Ct. at 2209.
39. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. According to the Chief Justice, this view arose from the
Patent Office decision in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123 in which a pat-
ent claim for fiber in the needle of pinus australis was rejected.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) note 7 supra.
41. Section 4888 of the Revised Statutes, then in force, was amended by adding to
the end, "no plant patent shall be declared invalid on the ground of noncompliance
with this section if the description is made as complete as is reasonably possible." 46
Stat. ch. 312, 376 (1930). The substance of this sentence is, today, the first sentence
of 35 U.S.C. § 162.
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group of plants specifically excluded under the 1930 Act.'
The Government's second argument relied primarily on
the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Flook4s and the
statement that the judiciary "must proceed cautiously when
... asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unfore-
seen by Congress." 44 The Government contended that since
genetic engineering was unforeseen when section 101 was en-
acted, questions regarding the patentability of man-made or-
ganisms should be left to Congress. The majority rejected this
argument, stating, "Flook did not announce a new principle
that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when
the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. To read
that concept into Flook would frustrate the purpose of the
patent law.' 5 The Court reasoned that Congress had em-
ployed broad general language in drafting section 101 because
many inventions are by their nature unforeseeable.
Also rejected were arguments raised by the People's Busi-
ness Commission, a public interest group'which presented a
"gruesome parade of horribles" and urged the Court to weigh
the potential risks posed by genetic engineering in reaching its
decision.'6 In declining to do so, the Court noted that "[t]he
grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to
put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks.' 7
Moreover, the Court considered that such policy matters
should be deferred to the political branches of government for
resolution. "Whatever their validity, the contentions now
42. 100 S. Ct. at 2210. Sexually reproduced plants were not included under the
1930 Act because new varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type through seed-
ings. By 1970, however, horticultural advances had made true-to-type reproduction
possible. As for the 1970 Act's exclusion of bacteria, the Chief Justice found two pos-
sible explanations. He reasoned it either reflected the fact that prior to 1970 the Pat-
ent Office had issued patents for bacteria under section 101 or indicated congressional
recognition of the decision in In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). There it
was held that the 1930 Plant Patent Act, read "in the common language of the peo-
ple" did not encompass bacteria despite the fact that bacteria are scientifically classi-
fied as plants. Id. at 838.
43. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
44. Id. at 596.
45. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
46. The People's Business Commision contended that genetic research and its
commercial application might spread disease and pollution, bring about a loss in ge-
netic diversity and depreciate the value of human life. Id.
47. Id. at 2211-12.
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pressed on us should be addressed to . . . the Congress and
the Executive, and not to the courts. '48
Justice Brennan's dissent faulted the Court for misinter-
preting the significance of the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the
1970 Plant Variety Protection Act.49 In Justice Brennan's
view, the Acts showed that Congress had addressed the gen-
eral problem of patenting animate inventions and had plainly
legislated in the belief that section 101 did not encompass liv-
ing organisms. Justice Brennan added that he would still dis-
sent even if the 1930 and 1970 Acts were not dispositive. "At
the very least," he contended, "these acts are signs of legisla-
tive attention to the problems of patenting living organisms,
but they give no affirmative indication of congressional intent
that bacteria be patentable." 0 Recalling the admonition of
Flook, Justice Brennan concluded, "I should think the neces-
sity for caution is that much greater when we are asked to
extend patent rights into areas which Congress has foreseen
and considered but has not resolved. '51
III. ANALYsis
Judging itself incompetent to properly deal with such mat-
ters, the Supreme Court correctly deferred to Congress the
resolution of larger policy issues surrounding genetic research
and its commercial application. Left with a narrow question of
statutory interpretation, the Court's determination rested on
an examination of the facts of the case, the language em-
ployed in section 101, the relevant legislative history, and the
constitutional and statutory purpose of the patent law.
Clearly, Chakrabarty's micro-organism is a product of
human ingenuity - a laboratory creation specifically engi-
neered for use in controlling oil spills. While a living organism
may not be considered to be a "manufacture" or "composition
of matter" as these terms are commonly used, the dictionary
definitions and judicial constructions applied to such terms
fairly embrace Chakrabarty's micro-organism.
The legislative history of section 101 is largely silent as to
48. Id. at 2212.
49. Justices White, Marshall and Powell joined Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion.
50. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
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the meaning and scope of the classes of patentable subject
matter. However, what little light is shed by such history sup-
ports the Court's decision. As the majority noted, the commit-
tee reports accompanying the 1952 recodification of the pat-
ent law indicate that Congress intended statutory subject
matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man."52 In explaining the scope of section 101, P.J. Federico, a
principal draftsman of the 1952 Act, employed identical lan-
guage in his testimony regarding that legislation.5
The Court's decision also accords with the general purpose
of the patent laws. The stated constitutional objective of the
patent law is to encourage the "Progress of Science and the
useful Arts. '54 It provides exclusive rights to inventors for
their creations in exchange for publicly disclosing their ideas.
These rights are of limited duration. Congress has enacted
patent laws in order that "[t]he productive effort thereby fos-
tered will have a positive effect on society through the intro-
duction of new products and processes of manufacture into
the economy, and the emanations by way of increased em-
ployment and better lives for our citizens. 5 5 A contrary deci-
sion by the Court might well have denied the public impor-
tant, useful information; without patent protection, inventors
such as Chakrabarty may have found it more profitable not to
disclose their discoveries, protecting them instead as trade
secrets. By granting patent protection for Chakrabarty's
micro-organism, the Court's decision encourages public disclo-
sure and gives impetus to a field of endeavor offering innu-
merable benefits to mankind.5
6
52. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1952).
53. "[U]nder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man. . . ." Hearings on
H.R. 3760 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1951). Federico has also described the language of section 101 as
delineating a "general industrial boundary" in Federico, Section 101: Subject Matter
for Patents, in THE LAW OF CHEMICAL, MErALLURGICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
53, 58 (H. Forman, ed. 1976). Viewing industry's domain as the production of any and
all things made by man, Chakrabarty's micro-organism is within the general indus-
trial boundary drawn by section 101.
54. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
55. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
56. Genetic researchers have already re-engineered bacteria to produce human in-
sulin, growth hormone and interferon, an antiviral protein which shows great promise
1980]
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As for the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Vari-
ety Protection Act, whatever Congress meant in enacting such
legislation, the legislative intent is sufficiently ambiguous to
support either the patentability or nonpatentability of living
organisms other than plants. Both the Senate and House re-
ports state that the 1930 Act had been drafted to "remove the
existing discrimination between plant developers and indus-
trial inventors," so that agriculture could be "[a]fford[ed]...
the benefits of patent protection. ' 57 However, the committee
reports fail to clarify the source or nature of the perceived dis-
crimination. The actual changes implemented by the 1930 Act
in the patent law only relaxed the written description require-
ment for plant patents. Moreover, the discussion of economic
and administrative considerations dominates the text of the
Act and the record of legislative deliberations. Reference to
the patentability of living organisms in general is all but ab-
sent.5 8 The same is true with regard to the text and legislative
history of the 1970 Act. To assert that the 1930 and 1970 Acts
represent exceptions to a general prohibition against patent-
ing living organisms is, therefore, to read a particular signifi-
cance into Congress' silence on this topic.
In the absence of a compelling congressional mandate, the
question arises as to the degree of discretion properly exer-
cised in interpreting a law which is without basis in the com-
mon law. The Chakrabarty decision clearly illustrates the di-
vision within the Supreme Court regarding this question. On
the one hand, there is a group of narrow constructionists, the
for the treatment of cancer. In the future, new micro-organisms may be programmed
to meet any number of medical needs. Outside the field of medicine, researchers pre-
dict the creation of micro-organisms for use in making fuels and plastics. Some may
be created to produce amino acids, the building blocks of protein, and used to relieve
world food shortages. Still others may be used to leech ores in mining operations or to
assist in the clean up of such foxic waste sites as Love Canal. Says molecular biologist
Herman Lewis, the National Science Foundation's adviser on recombinant DNA:
"Theoretically, any process occurring in nature can be harnessed for man's use."
TmE, June 30, 1980, at 52.
As something of a postscript, General Electric has abandoned plans to develop
Chakrabarty's micro-organism as a weapon against oil spills. Judging the market too
small for direct involvement, General Electric plans instead to offer licensing rights to
other firms. Id. at 53.
57. S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1930).
58. See note 38 supra.
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dissenting members of the Court in Chakrabarty.59 Their ap-
proach is summarized in the following quote:
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep
seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage
progress. Given the complexity and legislative nature of this
delicate task, we must be careful to extend patent protection
no further than Congress has provided. In particular, were
there an absence of legislative direction, the Courts should
leave the Congress the decisions whether and how far to ex-
tend the patent privilege into areas where the common un-
derstanding has been that patents are not available.60
In the view of the strict constructionists, a liberal interpreta-
tion of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter in-
vades a domain expressly left to Congress. If certain inven-
tions, such as genetically engineered organisms, are arguably
outside the statutory classes, then it is the duty of Congress to
expressly bring these new technologies within the scope of the
patent statutes.
On the other hand, there is a group of liberal construction-
ists, the Chakrabarty majority.6 1 The following quote charac-
terizes their approach: "We have cautioned that courts should
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which
the legislature has not expressed. '8 2 The liberal construction-
ists contend that when Congress enacted statutory classes of
patentable subject matter, it did not intend to have the speci-
59. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Powell. These same four justices plus
Justices Blackmun and Stevens constituted the majority in Flook. The salient feature
of Flook seems to support a narrow interpretation of the patent law.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (relying on
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)). For Justice Brennan,
Chakrabarty "present[ed] even more cogent reasons than Deepsouth Packing Co. not
to extend the patent monopoly in the face of uncertainty." Id. n.2. Justice Brennan's
reliance on Deepsouth Packing Co. would seem to be misplaced. The thrust of Deep-
south Packing Co., a patent infringement case, was that the courts "should not ex-
pand patent rights by overruling or modifying. . . prior cases construing the patent
statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere
inference from ambiguous statutory language." 406 U.S. at 531. As Chakrabarty
presented a question of first impression, the Supreme Court was not called upon to
overrule or modify any prior cases construing the scope of patentable subject matter.
61. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stevens.
Although a member of the Chakrabarty majority, Justice Stevens wrote the majority
opinion in Flook; he was joined in that opinion by Justice Blackmun.
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing United States v. Dublier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 199 (1933)).
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fled classes narrowly interpreted so as to exclude the products
of radical advances in science and industry. The statutory
classes were merely broad guidelines, since Congress realized
newer forms of technology might well outstrip conventional
notions of patentable subject matter.
It would seem that the approach of the liberal construc-
tionists is the preferable one. The very nature of technological
advance militates against an inflexible interpretation of the
statutory classes of patentable subject matter. Requiring Con-
gress to specifically consider each substantive technical ad-
vance before patents are granted in that field would under-
mine the constitutional and statutory purpose of encouraging
public disclosure and stimulating the creation of new technol-
ogies. Under the liberal constructionist approach, Congress re-
mains free to focus on specific areas of technology and to deny
or limit patent protection when policy considerations so
dictate.6 3
IV. Chakrabarty's IMPACT
A. Patent Law
The Chakrabarty decision eliminates the possibility that
patent claims for any living organism can be rejected solely on
the ground that the organism is alive. Questions remain, how-
ever, regarding the types of living organisms eligible for pat-
ent protection in Chakrabarty's wake. While Chakrabarty's
micro-organism was created by a relatively simple plasmid
transfer process, micro-organisms produced through more
complex recombinant DNA techniques should also qualify as
patentable subject matter under the Court's decision." As a
practical matter, higher life forms, such as animals created by
selective breeding; will likely remain unpatentable despite the
Court's holding in Chakrabarty. At the present time, the writ-
ten description requirement of section 112 appears to be an
63. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1970) exempts from patent protection inventions "use-
ful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic
weapon."
64. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the basic genetic material of all living orga-
nisms. Recombinant DNA or "gene splicing" techniques employ various enzymes to
break apart DNA and isolate certain desirable genes; these genes may then be trans-
ferred into another organism. The recipient organism, in effect, becomes a new life
form with all the characteristics and capabilities carried by the spliced genes.
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insurmountable obstacle for patent claims involving more
complex organisms.6 5 In contrast, simple micro-organisms
such as Chakrabarty's are so readily described that little diffi-
culty arises in achieving compliance with section 112. In the
future it is possible that a sufficiently precise description of
newly created varieties of higher life may be achieved. Con-
gress may also choose to act, extending patent protection to
animal breeders through an enactment analogous to the 1930
and 1970 plant patent legislation.
B. Industry
Whatever disagreement may exist regarding Chakrabarty's
practical impact on the biogenetic industry, the Supreme
Court's decision gives long awaited recognition to the com-
mercial significance of genetic engineering and heralds the be-
ginning of what is likely to become a new industrial revolu-
tion. In the eight years since Chakrabarty first applied for a
patent on his oil-eating micro-organism, genetic technology
has exploded. Almost monthly there are announcements of
new advances. The potential markets seem limitless, and en-
thusiasm among investors for biotechnology is growing
dramatically.
The genetic engineering industry now consists of at least a
dozen firms, large and small, that are either working on devel-
opments in bioengineering or supporting the work of others.
The attempt to apply laboratory advances in the commercial
arena appears to center on five small privately held con-
cerns, 6 although larger firms have also established research
and development programs.67 The lack of patent protection
for living organisms has not hindered genetic research or the
ability of biogenetic companies to acquire capital. Nelson M.
65. See In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The applicant in Merat
sought a patent for a dwarf hen that resulted from a selective breeding process. The
court upheld the rejection of this claim on the ground that it was indefinite under
section 112. However, it is important to note that even if the written description re-
quirement precluded obtaining a patent for the organism itself, a patent for the pro-
cess could still be obtained.
66. Cetus Corp. of Berkeley, Calif.; Genetech Corp. of San Francisco, Calif.;
Bethesda Research Laboratory, Inc. of Bethesda, Md.; Genex Corp. of Bethesda, Md.;
and Biogen S.A. of Geneva, Switzerland. Parisi, Gene Engineering Industry Hails
Court Ruling as Spur to Growth, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1980, § D. at 16, col. 3.
67. These include DuPont, Monsanto, Upjohn and General Electric Company.
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Schneider, a vice-president at E.F. Hutton and Co., estimates
that private capital for genetic research will approach $200
million in 1980; he expects that amount to climb to $1.9 bil-
lion by 1985." Thus it seems apparent that the bioengineering
industry would have continued to expand whatever the deci-
sion reached in Chakrabarty.
Exponents of bioengineering have greeted Chakrabarty
with mixed reviews. Niels Reimers, Stanford University's
manager of technological licensing, viewed Chakrabarty as a
landmark decision that will "encourage prompt and full dis-
closure of inventions, accelerate their commercial develop-
ment and thus bring beneficial results of microbiological re-
search to the public earlier. '69 Others fear the decision will
actually slow research. Jonathan King, a molecular biologist at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said, "Previously
there was a free exchange of organisms among scientists. But
now if you can patent a strain and make a bundle, the orga-
nisms won't be publicly available until a patent is granted. 7 0
Most companies engaged in genetic engineering view
Chakrabarty as having only a moderate impact on their oper-
ations. In practical terms, Chakrabarty will immediately af-
fect only a portion of the biogenetic industry. At present,
micro-organisms are used primarily as manufacturing agents
in various production processes; 1 patent protection for
processes involving micro-organisms was available prior to
Chakrabarty.72 Some experts also question the value of pat-
ents in a field where new developments are coming so rapidly;
a micro-organism or process that might be worth patenting to-
day may be obsolete in only a few years. Industry spokesmen
generally agree, however, that Chakrabarty places United
States firms on a better footing against foreign competitors73
68. BusiNEss WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 48.
69. Perlman, UC, Stanford Stand to Gain By the Ruling, S.F. Chronicle, June 17,
1980, at 9, col. 1.
70. NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1980, at 75.
71. SCIENCE NEWS, June 21, 1980, at 387.
72. Chakrabarty should provide a greater measure of protection for processes
utilizing new mirco-organisms than if only the processes were patentable. See note 22
supra.
73. Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1980,.at 24, col. 1. Under European pat-
ent conventions, an inventor can obtain protection in a foreign country if he obtains a
patent in his own country. Id.
[Vol. 63:711
PATENTS
and provides a welcome psychological boost. With the assur-
ance of patent protection, more companies and investors will
be willing to plunge into the expensive biogenetic field.
As of June, 1980, over a hundred patent applications for
new organisms or processes for making organisms were
stacked up on the Patent Office awaiting the outcome of
Chakrabarty. Even the most optimistic observers do not ex-
pect a flood of patents to be issued in the near future as there
are certain to be overlapping claims to litigate. The most im-
portant application pending is one covering basic gene-split-
ting techniques filed by Stanford University and the Univer-
sity of California. If this patent is granted, most companies
engaged in biogenetic technology may have to obtain licenses
from Stanford and pay royalties to both schools. Stanford offi-
cials say they will give nonexclusive licenses at a low royalty
but may demand licensees to comply with certain safety
requirements. 4
C. The Debate Surrounding Genetic Engineering
Represented by the People's Business Commission, critics
of biogenetic technology urged the Court to weigh the poten-
tial hazards of genetic engineering in reaching its decision in
Chakrabarty. Realizing that a decision denying patent protec-
tion would not halt the expansion of biogenetic technology,
the People's Business Commision sought, in effect, a stopgap
measure to at least delay expansion until a laggard Congress
could act. By rejecting the arguments of the People's Business
Commission and extending patent protection to man-made
micro-organisms, Chakrabarty placed squarely in the lap of
Congress the ever more pressing task of resolving the larger
policy issues surrounding genetic engineering. The people of
the United States, through their elected representatives must
now decide the extent to which they believe man should seek
to manipulate life at its most fundamental level and under
what restraints this should be done. The courts cannot make
that decision for them.
While genetic engineering has the potential for providing
society with brilliant scientific advances and substantial
74. Bishop, Decision on Newly Made Microbes Clears a Path for Scores of Patent
Office Rulings, wall St. J., June 17, 1980, at 3, col. 2.
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material gains, it also has the potential for generating serious
health, environmental and other social costs. Prominent scien-
tists have warned that recombinant DNA technology may re-
sult in man-made organisms capable of causing everything
from global epidemics to environmental and evolutionary
havoc.7 5 A larger number have stressed less drastic possibili-
ties, suggesting that human exposure to recombinant genes in
man-made organisms might disrupt the body's auto-immune
system or that labratory altered organisms might possibly
take on characteristics of certain disease causing strains that
exist in nature.76 Still other critics emphasize the frightening
possibilty of directing genetic engineering to the modification
and control of human behavior."
While most genetic researchers view such fears as vastly
exaggerated, it must be remembered that genetic engineering
techniques represent a quantum leap in man's power to ma-
nipulate living things. Historically, when comparable advances
in our power to alter the environment have occurred, it has
been impossible to anticipate and adequately manage all of
the consequences.7 8 Moreover, as the complex field of genetic
engineering is still in its infancy, the expertise of genetic re-
searchers is of limited value in predicting the possible impact
of the new technology. With no body of experience to draw on
to test opposing opinions, fundamental questions regarding
potential costs and benefits must necessarily remain
unanswered.
The present response to the potential dangers of genetic
engineering is a limited attempt to find suitable technical so-
lutions to the immediate hazards of laboratory research. In
1976, after prodding by scientists who made the early break-
throughs in recombinant DNA techniques, the National Insti-
tute of Health issued guidelines for government funded ge-
75. Milton, The Hazards of Altering Nature, THE NATION, Oct. 15, 1977, at 361.
76. Id.
77. According to Jeremy Rifkind of the People's Business Commission,
Chakrabarty "marks the beginning of the genetic age and gives corporations the
green light to begin engineering the gene pool." NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1980, at 74. In
Rifkind's view, "the Brave New World that Aldous Huxley warned of is now here."
Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1980, at 9, col. 3.
78. Our experience with nuclear energy and synthetic chemicals demonstrates
man's inability to foresee and effectively cope with the adverse side effects of
technology.
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netic research.79 The N.I.H. guidelines established mandatory
safety precautions for such research. 0 Industrial research and
development, however, is entirely unregulated. While most, if
not all, biotechnical companies have voluntarily complied with
N.I.H. guidelines, many observers feel that mandatory federal
regulation is necessary to control the expanding industry. Too
rapid commercial application of the new techniques could eas-
ily lead to tragic and irreversible mistakes.
Although committee hearings have been held since 1975,
Congress has yet to enact a single piece of legislation for the
control of genetic engineering.81 Recognition of the need of
some form of regulation is widespread, and because of the ac-
celerating pace of industrial development, presumably further
spurred by Chakrabarty, there is an urgent need to keep regu-
lations of genetic engineering on the political agenda. More-
over, given the far reaching implications of genetic technology,
it is essential that the public be informed and involved in
every step of the decision making process.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabarty is a rela-
tively well-reasoned holding and a sound interpretation of 35
U.S.C. § 101. The Court's decision is supported by the terms
of the statute and the relevant legislative history. Moreover,
the Court's liberal construction of section 101 accords with
79. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,920 (1976).
80. In 1978, N.I.H. guidelines were revised and relaxed. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080,
60,108, 60,134 (1978). The relaxation of N.I.H. guidelines was chiefly inspired by new
research indicating that Escherichia coli K12, the standard bacterium used to propo-
gate recombinant DNA molecules, is a safer host than originally believed. SCIENCE,
Jan. 6, 1978, at 78. However, a considerable amount of debate still remains regarding
the adequacy of N.I.H. safeguards. See generally Wright, Setting Science Policy, EN-
WRONMENr, May, 1978.
81. Numerous proposed bills have been defeated largely because of the efforts of
an active lobby of genetic researchers. Fearful of bureaucratic interference in their
work, genetic researchers have begun to behave like a pressure group whose vital in-
terests are at stake. This occurrence may make it even more difficult for the public to
make informed decisions regarding genetic engineering. The evidence is so technically
complex that we must rely on the judgments of experts as they filter down to us
through the media. If the experts cannot maintain a position of neutrality in the
debate, then the public is likely to remain ignorant of the potential risks involved.
See generally, Milton, The Hazards of Altering Nature, THE NATION, Oct. 15, 1977.
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the general purposes underlying the enactment of the patent
laws.
Although presenting only a narrow question of statutory
interpretation, Chakrabarty deservedly received broad cover-
age in the popular press. While Chakrabarty's impact on pat-
ent law appears to be relatively minor, the decision's implica-
tions in other areas may be far-reaching. Hailed as a classic
example of law lagging behind technology, Chakrabarty gave
recognition to the emerging genetic engineering industry. Fur-
ther spurred by Chakrabarty's grant of patent protection, the
proliferation of this new technology promises to have a revolu-
tionary impact on society. The Supreme Court wisely having
bowed out, the many social, biological, environmental and
ethical questions surrounding genetic engineering must now
be resolved in the political arena, where the balancing of com-
peting values and interests promises to be no easy task.
MICHAEL T. DAY
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